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Introduction 
This paper examines the readiness for EMU of the EU countries, using 
techniques of "fuzzy clustering" to ascertain the "degree of belongingness" of 
each country, either to a core group of EMU-ready countries or to some other 
grouping. Several studies of the "core" and "periphery" of EMU already exist in 
the literature: the classic example is perhaps Bayoumi and Eichengreen (1993), 
but reference may also be made to Canzoneri et al. (1996), Bayoumi and 
Eichengreen ( 1997a and 1997b ), Taylor ( 1995) and an earlier study by the 
present authors (Artis and Zhang 1998), among others. In this light and, more 
especially, given the fact that the initial membership of EMU has already been 
determined by the decision taken in May 1998 to proceed with EMU on a broad 
(EU-11) basis from 1st January 1999, the value of a further investigation of this 
type might seem to need particular justification. 
In fact, a motivation is easy to provide. First, the question of the 
homogeneity of the EMU membership is clearly of significance for the smooth 
running and sustainability of the declared "Euro-zone". Second, there remains 
the issue of the "Outs" or "Pre-ins", the position of the UK, Sweden, Denmark 
and Greece, currently not included in the "Euro-zone". A study such as the 
present one may help identify the sources of tension inside the EMU and the 
areas where special adjustment problems may exist, as well as identifying 
whether an economic rationale exists for the current exclusion of the four 
countries just mentioned. Third, this study deploys a method for detecting 
inhomogeneities - fuzzy clustering - which has not to our knowledge previously 
been employed in this area. Fourth, and finally, we take the occasion here to 
explore the differences that exist between the Maastricht Treaty criteria broadly 
defined and the criteria developed in the economics literature following the 
pioneering study by Mundell (1961) - the so-called "optimal currency area 
(OCA)" criteria. Whilst the Maastricht Treaty criteria focus on the single 
criterion of"stability orientation" as reflected in a range of nominal convergence 
variables (see Winkler (1996) for a discussion), the OCA criteria pertain to real 
convergence, emphasizing especially as criteria for a monetary union the 
prevalence of a high degree of intra-trade among the members and the absence 
of any pronounced asymmetry in the pattern of shocks impacting their 
economies. 
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. In the next section we discuss 
first the methodology of fuzzy clustering, clarifying the associated diagnostic 
statistics and the requirements, in terms of the type of variable involved, of the 
analysis. Then, in Section 2 we turn to discuss the OCA criteria and the 
representation we give them in this study. The section concludes with a 
discussion of the results obtained by applying fuzzy clustering methods to these 
data. In Section 3, we discuss the Maastricht Treaty criteria and display the 
results obtained in applying methods of fuzzy clustering to variables reflecting 
those criteria. Section 4 compares the results obtained using the Maastricht 
Treaty criteria with those already obtained for the OCA criteria. Then Section 
5 provides some overall conclusions, including some observations on the degree 
to which the criteria may be "endogenous". 
1. Fuzzy clustering analysis 
In this paper, fuzzy clustering analysis is proposed to examine the similarities 
and dissimilarities of economic structure in the data and to uncover 
homogeneous subgroups. Fuzzy clustering is a type of data partitioning, in which 
each object in the data set is assigned a "degree of belongingness" to each 
cluster. The degree of belongingness is quantified by means of membership 
coefficients. Fuzzy clustering has more power in approximating the situation 
involving incomplete and uncertain information and produces more detailed 
information on the structure of the data than does hard clustering. 
The algorithm of fuzzy analysis used in this paper is discussed here briefly 
(see Anderberg (1993) Kaufman and Rousseeuw (1990) for more details). In the 
terminology of fuzzy analysis there are n objects (countries) and p variables 
(features) in a data set with each object being denoted by a vector xi 
(X;=(xil, ... ,X;p) for i=l, ... ,n). Each variable is standardised with mean and standard 
deviation being equal to zero and unity respectively so that they are treated as 
having equal importance in determining the structure. The dissimilarity 
coefficient or distance, 11 X;-JS 11 , between two objects, X; and JS• is defined as the 
Euclidean distance1 
(1) 
The particular technique in fuzzy clustering used in this paper is called the fuzzy 
1 With only 13 or 14 observations in our sample, it is difficult to choose a proper 
mathematical form to express the statistical distribution of this data set. In this paper, we use 
the Euclidean distance to measure the dissimilarity between objects, which is the most 
common measure in clustering analysis. 
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k -means method proposed by Dunn (197 4) and Bezdek ( 197 4 ), which is based 
on the minimization of the following objective function: 
m 
m E E 2 2 uik ujk llx; - x/ 
E i j (2) 
k 2E 2 ujk 
subject to the following constraints2 : 
for i=l, 2, ... , n; j=1, 2, ... , m (3) 
in which uij stands for the membership coefficient of object X; belonging to 
cluster j and m is the number of clusters. 
It is useful to introduce two diagnostic statistics employed in fuzzy analysis: 
Dunn' s partition coefficient and the average silhouette width; these are important 
indicators of the structure found in the data. Dunn' s partition coefficient is used 
to measure the degree of fuzziness, which is defined as the sum of squares of 
all the membership coefficients divided by the number of objects and may be 
further normalized as in the following formula: 
- 1 (4) 
m - 1 
1 In fuzzy clustering, the membership coefficients of each object are non-negative, with 
their sum over all clusters being equal to one. On the contrary, in hard clustering, membership 
coefficients are effectively forced to take the value of either one or zero. In this respect. fuzzy 
clustering conveys more information. 
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The normalized Dunn's coefficient, F m• varying from I to 0 is a useful indicator 
of the data structure: a value close to 1 indicates no fuzziness in the data whilst 
a value close to 0 indicates complete fuzziness. 
Average silhouette width can be used to measure how well an object or a 
cluster or the whole data set is classified. For a data partition Oq=[ffi 1, ... ,ffi 4] with 
q clusters in it, each cluster being denoted by ffik (k=l , ... ,q). the :werage 
dissimilarity of object x, to all other objects in cluster ffik is defined as 
(5) 
where I ffik I denotes the number of objects in the cluster. If X; Effik, d(x1,ffik) 
indicates the average dissimilarity of object X; to all objects in its own cluster 
(intra-dissimilarity); if X; (!!:ffik, d(X;,ffik) indicates the average dissimilarity of 
object x, to all objects in other clusters (inter-dissimilarity). The silhouette width, 
s(i), of object X; may be obtained as: 
b(i) -a(i) 
-1 ,; s(i) d (6) s(i) 
max[a(i), b(i)] 
where a(i) denotes the intra-dissimilarity and b(i) denotes the smallest inter-
dissimilarity. When s(i) is close to 1, it is implied that the intra-dissimilarity is 
much smaller than the smallest inter-dissimilarity, and it can then be said that 
object i is well classified into an appropriate cluster. When s(i) approaches 0, 
then a(i) and b(i) are approximately equal and it is not clear to which cluster the 
object i should be assigned. When s(i) approaches -I, it is implied that the intra-
dissimilarity is much larger than the smallest inter-dissimilarity and hence that 
object i is misclassified. 
Similarly, the average silhouette width of a cluster is calculated as the 
average of the s(i) for all objects in that cluster, and is thus an indicator of how 
well a cluster is classified. The average silhouette width for the whole data set 
is computed as the average of the s(i) for all objects, and can be used as an 
indicator to search for the "optimal" number of clusters in the data. 
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2. The OCA criteria 
The foundations of the traditional theory of optimal currency areas were laid by 
Mundell (1961) and McKinnon (1963), with important elaborations by, among 
others, Kenen (1969) and Krugman (1990). The latter stresses that the criteria 
can be seen as forming the basis for a cost-benefit calculus. Thus, the benefit of 
a common currency will be the larger the greater the scope for economizing on 
exchange costs by adopting it (i.e. the greater the volume of trade), whilst the 
costs of adopting the common currency are essentially the negative of the 
benefits of having an independent monetary policy and exchange rate. 
An independent monetary policy, with the potential for an adjustment in 
the real exchange rate, is useful as a means of coping with shocks that are 
asymmetric between the potential partners in a monetary union. A compensation 
for the lack of an independent monetary policy can be found in a federal fiscal 
policy which would effect transfers between countries impacted by asymmetric 
shocks whilst labour mobility between the partner countries can offset the labour 
market consequences of such shocks. More recent contributions to this line of 
literature have added further factors: for example, that internal labour market 
flexibility may be a good substitute for the external labour mobility stressed in 
the original literature; that more open economies are likely to be ones where 
nominal exchange rate change will not readily translate into real exchange rate 
change (the external content of the consumer basket will be so great that 
offsetting wage and price adjustments are nearly automatic); that access to a 
common capital market can do the work that the earlier literature envisaged 
might be done by a federal fiscal system; and so on. 
These elaborations do not affect the spirit of the OCA approach. Two of 
the most recent additions do. First, whilst the creators of the OCA tradition 
relied on a fix-price assumption, it has become clear in practical experience that 
a strong incentive for monetary union is created by an assurance that the union's 
inflation rate will be low. See Tavlas (1993) for an account. Second, it has 
recently been asserted that the OCA criteria are "endogenous", in the important 
sense that a growth in trade promoted by a union would have the effect of 
inducing greater symmetry in the stochastic experience of the partner economies; 
in this way the criteria might be better satisfied ex post than ex ante (Frankel 
and Rose (1997, 1998)). Alternatively, it might be argued that the common 
monetary policy itself eliminates a primary source of asymmetric shocks: the 
ERM experience is consistent, though only in part, with this proposition (Artis 
and Zhang (1997)). Of these two more recent additions, we set the latter on one 
side in this paper. Evidence in favour of the "endogenous criteria" approach is 
still limited to a handful of papers and might fairly be described as more 
5 
suggestive than conclusive at this stage. On the other hand, it seems reasonable 
to incorporate the inflation criterion within the set of criteria suggested by the 
traditional approach, if only in the spirit of a normalization of the fix-price 
assumption on which the traditional approach is founded. 
2.1 The variables used 
In this paper, cluster analysis is first applied to a set of variables, the choice of 
which is inspired by the OCA criteria, supplemented by an inflation criterion. 
In what follows, we describe the choice of statistical correlates that are used in 
the subsequent analysis. In following this description the nature of cluster 
analysis must be borne in mind; in particular, it needs emphasizing that cluster 
analysis is a means of pattern recognition, a way of discerning homogenous 
groups. With this in mind, we proceed by initially designating Germany as the 
'centre country'; then the task of the analysis is to group together countries 
which are similar to each other in respect, basically, of their relationship, or 
similarity, to Germany. Although our choice of variables to be measured with 
respect to Germany is inspired by OCA theory, it is the similarity criterion 
which is dominant, because this is the fundamentum of cluster analysis. Thus, 
following the criteria suggested by optimal currency area theory, we choose six 
variables by which to describe each of the EU economies. These are: I) the 
synchronisation of the business cycle in a country with the German one; 2) the 
volatility of a country's real exchange rate against the Deutsche mark; 3) the 
synchronisation in its real interest rate cycle with the German one; 4) its 
openness to trade with Germany; 5) its inflation differential against Germany 
and 6) its employment protection legislation ranking. We now turn to consider 
each of the variables proposed in detail3• 
Synchronisation in business cycle phase 
Eschewing the SV AR identification of shocks favoured by Bayoumi and 
Eichengreen (1993) we employ a more "atheoretical" approach and adopt the 
method of Baxter and Stockman ( 1989). Business cycles are identified for each 
country by applying the Hodrick-Prescott filter to monthly series of industrial 
production, and cross-correlations of the cyclical components vis-a-vis those 
3 A similar account appears in Artis and Zhang (1998) where "hard" clustering is applied 
to the same set of variables. 
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identified for Germany then proxy business cycle symmetry4• The same method 
was used in Artis and Zhang ( 1997). 
Volatility in the real exchange rate 
The traditional OCA approach identifies the cost of currency union membership 
with the loss of an independent monetary policy, more specifically the loss of 
a separate exchange rate. Of course, it is the real exchange rate that is at issue 
here, even though monetary policy can only directly influence the nominal rate. 
A "revealed performance" argument thus suggests that a variable measuring 
variation in the real exchange rate, in the present case against the DM, the 
currency of the putative "centre" country, would be appropriate: if there has been 
little cause for variation in the real exchange rate, then little will be revealed and 
the cost of moving to a single currency can be assumed to be smaW. We 
represent volatility in the real DM exchange rate by the standard deviation of the 
log-difference of real bilateral DM exchange rates, where deflation is 
accomplished using relative wholesale (producer) prices. 
Synchronisation in the real interest rate cycle 
A third variable is also indicated by a "revealed preference" argument. If in fact 
the monetary policy of a candidate country historically has differed little from 
that in Germany the cost of relinquishing independence is accordingly low. 
Thus we assume that synchronisation in real interest rates may be interpreted as 
an indicator of coordination in monetary policy with Germany. Specifically, we 
measure monetary policy synchronization by reference to the cross-correlation 
of the cyclical components of the real interest rate cycle of a country with that 
in Germany. The detrending was accomplished by applying the H-P filter to 
monthly series of real interest rates, defined as the difference between a short-
term nominal rate (assumed to be "set" by the Central Bank) and the rate of 
consumer price inflation. 
4 The Hodrick-Prescott filter is applied here with a relatively high value for the 
dampening parameter A of 50,000. The figure was chosen in light of the fact that our 
industrial production data are monthly and are relatively noisy; additionally, in earlier work 
(Artis and Zhang, 1997) we found that setting such a value for the dampening parameter 
reproduces the series of cyclical components implied by the OECD's PAT (Phase Average 
Trend) detrending method (see Nilsson (1987) for an explanation of the OECD' s 
methodology). 
5 The implicit assumption - that a freely floating exchange rate would move "in the right 
way" to offset asymmetric shocks -admittedly receives little support from Canzoneri et al. 
( 1996) who investigate this proposition. but on the other hand. there is encouraging support 
to be found in Bayoumi and Eichengreen (1998). 
7 
Openness to trade . . . 
Our measure of this criterion is provided by data on bilateral trade mtens1ty, I.e. 
for any country i as ( Xjg+mig)/{Xj+m) where Xj and mi are exports and imports 
(of goods) and subscript g indicates as destination or source Germany, the centre 
country in this exercise. 
Inflation Convergence 
Whilst the traditional OCA literature offers real variables as criteria, we 
supplement these here with a measure of inflation convergence, specifically the 
differential in consumer price inflation against Germany. 
Labour market flexibility 
Traditional OCA theory emphasizes the importance of labour mobility. The data 
available now suggest that whilst international labour mobility is quite low in the 
European countries, it is not much lower than interregional labour mobility 
within member countries, which is also low. Gros and Thygesen (1998) suggest 
that it is the difference between interregional and international labour mobility 
that should count. Meanwhile, it is generally agreed that in the face of shocks 
that cannot be easily buffered internal labour market flexibility is desirable; 
relatively fast adjustment of employment and of wages reduces the persistence 
in unemployment that will otherwise be induced. This type of argument has 
dominated much of the discussion of the policy adjustment appropriate for high 
unemployment in Europe in the 1980s and 1990s. One measure of the rigidity 
of labour markets that has been used (e.g. OECD (1994)) is a ranking measure 
of the severity of employment protection legislation; it is such a variable that is 
used here as an indicator of labour market flexibilitl. 
2.2 The sample period 
The data corresponding to the measures described above are shown in Table I, 
whilst the corresponding sample period for each variable - generally from April 
1979 to Autumn 1995 is indicated in Appendix A. The values shown in Table 
1 are averages over these sample periods7• 
Table l. Criteria by optimal currency area theory 
6 Buti et al. ( 1998) provide a recent discussion of the possible significance of this variable 
in labour market adjustment. 
1 In the clustering analysis the values reported as missing in Table I and Table 3 are 
interpolated from other variables using a regression model. 
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Correlation in Volatility 1 in Correlation in Trade (% of Inflation Labour markel 
business cycle exchange rate interest rate cycle total trade) differential (%) indicator.' 
France .683 1.118 .334 16.853 2.365 
Italy .459 1.732 .207 18.467 5.744 13 
Netherlands .730 .582 .587 26.181 -.204 
Belgium .634 .864 .529 21.353 .835 10 
Denmark .343 1.039 -.015 20.303 2.037 I 
Austria .745 .907 .216 38.525 .432 9 
Ireland .193 1.244 .136 9.650 3.634 
Spain .444 1.617 -.141 12.623 5.177 12 
Portugal .474 1.629 .031 14.156 10.398 11 
Sweden .289 1.835 -.031 15.515 3.322 6 
Finland -.075 1.769 .095 13.284 2.279 
Greece .235 1.710 n.a.2 19.132 13.848 n.a.2 
UK .217 2.174 .017 13.137 3.305 
Notes: 
I. Standard deviation ( x 1 02) of the log difference in bilateral real exchange rate against deutsche 
mark. 
2. "n.a" denotes that adequate series are not available. 
3. Country rankings of employment protection legislation are from the OECD. The rank for 
Germany is 8. 
2.3 The results 
Table 2 shows the results of applying fuzzy clustering analysis to these data, 
where the number of clusters is taken as being equal to 2 and 3 respectively, 
both of which provide a clear-cut data partition with significantly large 
membership coefficients for belonging to one group only and significantly 
positive silhouettes for all objects. On the whole, a classification of three clusters 
provides a slightly better data partition measured by the silhouettes and the 
normalized Dunn's coefficient. Thus we concentrate on the results obtained from 
three clusters in the following discussion. The values of the silhouettes for each 
of the three clusters (0.56, 0.53, 0.60 respectively) and for the whole data set 
(0.57) are reasonably high, suggesting that a reasonable structure exists in the 
data. Silhouettes per object are all positive indicating that each country is well-
clustered into a proper group. 
Thus one of the most interesting features of Table 2 is that a classification 
of three groups is identified with little fuzziness in their membership coefficients 
and those groups may be described as consisting of: 
9 
0 
Table 2. Membership coefficient (%) by OCA criteria 
Two clusters 
I (( Cluster vector Silhouenes: s(i) I (( 
!'ranee 80.2 19.8 I .31 62.7 19.9 
Italy 27.0 73.0 (( .42 11.6 18.5 
Netherlands 89.0 11.0 I .75 87.3 7.0 
Belgium 91.9 8.1 I .68 87.9 6.I 
Denmark 42.2 57.8 (( .18 22.8 58.7 
Austria 78.7 21.3 I .59 66.7 16.2 
Ireland 17.4 82.6 11 .61 8.4 75.8 
Spain 13.0 87.0 11 .68 8.1 28.7 
Portugal 17.4 82.6 11 .64 2.1 4.9 
Sweden 5.6 94.4 (( .72 3.2 86.8 
Finland 18.5 81.5 11 .64 6.1 82.5 
Greece 25.9 74.1 11 .56 8.1 15.5 
UK 15.3 84.7 11 .67 5.3 82.9 
Average silhoueue 
width per cluster .58 .57 .56 .53 
Average silhoueue 
width of whole data set .57 .57 
Normalized 
Dunn's coefficient .43 .45 
Note: Bold figures indicate the largest membership coefficients. 
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with the partial exception of Denmark with a membership coefficient of 22.8%. 
It seems clear that the countries in the core group have some common features 
which are far from being fully shared by other countries. What these features are 
is readily apparent from Table 1; they include I) a high degree of business cycle 
symmetry with Germany; 2) low volatility in the real DM exchange rate; 3) a 
high degree of synchronization in monetary policy with Germany; 4) a high 
percentage of trade with Germany; 5) a convergence of inflation towards the 
German level and 6) similar rankings of employment protection legislation as 
Germany. On this evidence, economies in the core group are much more 
symmetric than the whole group, suggesting that these countries are good 
candidates to form a monetary union. 
The Northern periphery group 
The Northern periphery group contains three Scandinavian countries {Denmark, 
Sweden, Finland} plus Ireland and the UK. The membership coefficients of all 
countries belonging to this group are significantly higher than for those 
belonging to either group-I or group-HI. For example, the membership 
coefficients for Sweden, Finland and the UK in belonging to this group are 
86.8%, 82.5% and 82.9% respectively. Silhouettes for all countries in the group 
are significantly positive, suggesting that all countries in the group are well-
classified. These statistics suggest that economies measured by the OCA criteria 
are much more similar within the group than between groups. The Northern 
peripheral group distances itself from the core in three main respects (cf. Table 
1 ): 1) the business cycle is less synchronised with the German cycle; 2) the 
exchange rate against the DM is more volatile and 3) there is less protection of 
the labour market in this group than in the core. 
It is of interest to note that the decision made by the UK, Denmark and 
Sweden in this group not to join the first wave of EMU could be held to be 
consistent with the economic fundamentals as identified here. For example, in 
the case of the UK and Sweden, their exchange rates against the OM are among 
the most volatile and the degree of business cycle and monetary policy 
symmetry with Germany are among the lowest (even though both countries 
could substantially satisfy the Maastricht criteria actually applied in May 1998). 
By the same argument, Finland and Ireland have chosen to belong to 
EMU on grounds other than those identified here as economic fundamentals. 
The marginal position of Denmark identified here is also perhaps particularly 
apt. 
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The Southern periphery group 
The Southern periphery or Mediterranean group contains four countries {Italy, 
Spain, Portugal, Greece}. Each country in this group also has a significantly 
high membership coefficient and a positive silhouette suggesting that the 
Southern periphery group is an independent group in the sense that it distances 
itself both from the core and from the Northern periphery group; there is a high 
degree of symmetry within the group. 
The predominant features in the group may be described as 1) a medium 
volatility in the exchange rate against the DM; 2) low synchronisation in the 
interest rate cycle; 3) dispersion in the rate of inflation against the German one 
and 4) high employment protection legislation in their labour markets. 
To summarize, the set of OCA-related variables employed here to 
characterize the EU economies from the point of view of their homogeneity with 
Germany identifies a tightly knit core, with two peripheral groups. The 
constituents of the core are similar to those identified in other studies (e.g. 
Bayoumi and Eichengreen (1993), Taylor (1995)), whilst our study identifies 
two separate peripheral groups. We now turn to discuss the identifications that 
the use of Maastricht Treaty variables would lead to. 
3. The Maastricht Treaty criteria· 
The Maastricht Treaty laid down a set of criteria to be fulfilled by countries 
aspiring to participate in EMU. Although, in the event, the criterion pertaining 
to the debt/GDP ratio was effectively set aside when the EU-11 countries were 
nominated, the other criteria were generally fulfilled and countries evidently 
responded to the incentive created in the Treaty by the setting of a clear deadline 
(see Winkler ( 1996) for an analysis of the Treaty as an incentive contract). The 
Maastricht criteria refer to exchange rate stability, the budget deficit/GDP and 
debt/GDP ratios, and to convergence in the rate of inflation and long-term 
interest rates. Whilst the Treaty set precise values to be achieved in respect of 
all these criteria (for example the 3% and 60% "reference values" set for the 
budget/GDP and debt/GDP ratios respectively) here we simply use the absolute 
values of these variables. The Treaty criteria evidently can be regarded as 
concentrating on the single issue of 'stability orientation' as this may be 
recognized in current and prospective inflation achievement, the stance of fiscal 
policy and exchange rate behaviour. Not surprisingly, the criteria have been 
criticized for ignoring 'the real side' of the economy, and for concentrating 
attention on the value of the criteria proposed in a short assessment period. (The 
Treaty refers to the 'year before the examination', in respect of most of the 
l3 
criteria and with respect to the exchange rate criterion refers to a period of two 
years). The lack of attention to real side factors is made good by the OC A 
criteria, whilst here we take account of the assessment period problem by 
examining the data both for 1997 (the 'year before the examination') and for 
longer periods. It could be argued that the longer period data provide a more 
accurate guide to the true 'stability orientation' of a country, in that they avoid 
dependence on 'creative accounting' and possible short-term unsustainable policy 
adjustments. On the other hand, they deny the possibility that the Treaty 
deadlines created a genuine incentive to change stability orientation. 
3.1 The variables used 
Table 3 displays the variables used to represent the Maastricht Treaty criteria, 
with three alternative sample periods - 1997, 1995-97 and 1990-97. Exchange 
rate volatility is measured as the (monthly) average over the relevant period of 
the standard deviation of Lllogx, where x is the bilateral DM nominal exchange 
rate. For Germany xis defined as the DM exchange rate against the other EMS 
currencies; the deficit!GDP and debt!GDP ratios are measured in the manner 
specified in the relevant protocols to the Treaty (e.g., 'debt' is gross debt). The 
inflation rate is the CPI inflation rate, as specified in the Treaty (precise 
definition and sources are shown in Appendix A). 
3.2 The results 
The data partitions based on the Maastricht Treaty criteria are reported in Tables 
4 and 5. Table 4 shows the results based on the 1997 data actually used to 
decide on membership of the first wave of EMU. The results for the three 
overlapping periods are reported in Table 5 in which we examine how 
membership coefficients .vary across periods. 
3.3 Membership in 1997 
Two sets of results are shown in Table 4, corresponding to whether the number 
of clusters (m) is chosen as 2 or 3. We may note that the silhouettes for Italy, 
the UK and cluster-II are -0.56, -0.42 and -0.21 when m=2, indicating that the 
two countries and cluster-II are 
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3) the average debt/GDP ratio is lower than that in the core. Denmark, Sweden 
and the UK, which decided not to join EMU for the time being are all in this 
group, although their economic performance might have satisfied the Maastricht 
Treaty examination9• Group Ill, meanwhile, consists only of Greece 10• 
Overall, our results are very close to the actual decision made in May 1998 
on the composition of the Euro-zone. The only exceptions are that on our 
analysis Ireland and Finland do not look like the core group. Denmark is again 
interestingly marginal - with quite a high core group membership coefficient 
(43%) but an even higher one for Group-11 (51.9%). 
3.4 Membership across periods 
Table 5 and Figure 1 show the membership coefficients for EMU by Maastricht 
Treaty criteria across three overlapping periods. The mam results may be 
summarized as follows: 
9 Formally, the principal obstacle would be the Treaty's exchange rate requirement which 
requires ERM membership. 
10 When a cluster contains only a single object, s(i) is set to zero. 
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The countries in the core group {Germany, France, the Netherlands, 
Belgium, Austria} display a robust performance across periods with significantly 
large membership coefficients throughout for group-! (core group). Sweden and 
the UK are viewed as always belonging to group-II, which distances itself from 
the core in the sense that 1) exchange rates of both currencies vs. the DM are 
the most volatile almost all the time; 2) their long-term interest rates remain 
significantly higher than the German one and 3) the rate of inflation in the UK 
remains higher than that in the core. 
The membership coefficients of Italy, Spain and Portugal for belonging to 
the core group increase significantly over time. For example, the membership 
coefficients of Spain and Portugal for belonging to the core increase from I 0. 8% 
and 27.3% in 1990-97 to 12.2% and 34.5% in 1995-97 and reach 88.5% and 
80.6% in 1997 respectively. All three countries, if in particular, Spain and 
Portugal, have made rapid progress towards meeting the Maastricht Treaty 
criteria, as reflected in the facts that 1) volatility in their exchange rates against 
the DM has been reduced significantly; 2) their long-term interest rates and 
inflation rates have converged gradually on the German level. 
On the contrary, the membership coefficient of Denmark and Ireland in 
respect of their belonging to the core group decreases gradually across periods. 
For example, both countries are classified as belonging to the core with 
significantly large membership coefficients in 1990-1997, but are classified as 
joining the Northern periphery group in 1997. Both countries meet the 
Maastricht Treaty criteria with even smaller deficitJGDP ratios than the average 
of the core. However, in the case of Ireland, its exchange rate against the DM 
is quite volatile and its long-term interest rate remains slightly higher than the 
core; for Denmark, the long-term interest rate and the rate of inflation remain 
slightly higher than the core. It is these features together with a much lower 
deficitJGDP ratio (a distinguishing feature in the Northern periphery group) that 
classify both countries into the Northern periphery group in 1997. 
To summarise, when we compare economic performance measured by 
Maastricht Treaty criteria across three overlapping periods, some interesting 
regularities emerge. These results may be described as I) there is a group 
containing {Germany, France, the Netherlands, Austria, Belgium} which can be 
identified as having a robust performance against the criteria across all periods, 
with significantly large membership coefficients; 2) Sweden and the UK are also 
identified as those countries which always distance themselves from the core and 
3) while the membership coefficients of Italy, Spain and Portugal for joining the 
core group increase significantly over the time, those for Ireland and Denmark 
decrease across periods. 
21 
4. OCA and Maastricht Treaty criteria compared 
How do our identifications of groups based on the OCA criteria compare with 
those recognised by using the Maastricht Treaty criteria? Table 6 provides a 
comparison in a classification of three groups based on the two sets of criteria: 
OCA criteria vs. Maastricht Treaty criteria. It can immediately be seen that. on 
the one hand, the two sets of criteria provide strikingly similar results despite the 
fact that those criteria are quite different and in particular, the data periods used 
to measure OCA criteria are much longer than those used m respect of the 
Maastricht Treaty criteria. On the other hand, some interestingly dissimilar 
results also emerge because of the differences between the criteria. 
The similarities identified by two sets of criteria shown in Table 6 may be 
summarized as follows: 1) both sets of criteria identify the same core group 
{Germany, France, the Netherlands, Belgium, Austria} so this IS a robust 
identification across criteria; 2) both 
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criteria sets recognise identically the Northern periphery group {Denmark. 
Sweden, Finland, Ireland, the UK}, which distances itself from the core and 3) 
Greece is identified as quite a different country by both criteria sets. 
The dissimilarity mainly reflects the fact that Italy, Spain and Portugal are 
identified as belonging to the Southern periphery group by the OCA criteria but 
join the core group by the Maastricht Treaty criteria, with significantly large 
membership coefficients for Spain and Portugal and the lowest membership 
coefficient for Italy. 
What are the implications of these comparisons? The results might help 
rationalize the position of various countries vis-a-vis EMU. That member states 
in the core group {Germany, France, the Netherlands, Belgium, Austria} are 
good candidates for EMU is recognized by both sets of criteria. These findings 
are also confirmed by Bayoumi and Eichengreen (1993) who find a core group 
contains {Germany, France, the Netherlands, Belgium, Denmark} in their 
analysis of demand and supply shocks among eight regions in the US and 11 
countries in Europe. They include Denmark in the core which we do not - but 
outside the core countries, we find that Denmark has the largest membership 
coefficient for belonging to the core, whichever criterion set is used. 
The EMU membership of Italy, Spain and Portugal has been debated by 
politicians and economists. The arguments on membership for those countries 
are also reflected in our results in that they are identified as countries joining in 
the core by Maastricht Treaty criteria based on the 1997 economic performance, 
but classified as those belonging to a periphery group by OCA criteria, which 
distance themselves from the core. In judging these results, one has to keep in 
mind that in this comparison membership of EMU by the Maastricht Treaty 
criteria is assessed on the 1997 economic performance only (exchange rate 
stability is based on the period from 1996 to 1997), while the OCA criteria used 
in this paper are based on a period from 1979 to 1997, which may reflect 
longer-term economic fundamentals. Although membership of EMU for Italy, 
Spain and Portugal was granted, OCA criteria indicate that an asymmetry 
between these new corners and the core remains. This implies that it is 
particularly important for these countries to achieve a sustainable convergence 
in fundamentals. Finally, because of their asymmetric nature, some countries 
may face relatively large potential shocks. The "one-size-fits-all" monetary 
policy will be inappropriate to certain member countries given the asymmetries 
within the system. 
It has been mentioned above that both sets of criteria identically recognise 
the Northern periphery group {Denmark, Sweden, Finland, Ireland, the UK}, 
24 
suggesting the structure within the group is indeed different from that in the 
core. Three countries, Denmark, Sweden and the UK, which decided not to join 
the first wave of EMU are all within this group, indicating the intra-similarity 
within the group and inter-dissimilarity between this group and the core. 
Enthusiasm for joining EMU in Finland and Ireland, on the other hand, is not 
explained by our findings, which place the two countries in a peripheral position 
by both sets of criteria. 
5. Conclusions 
This paper has used fuzzy cluster analysis to recognize homogenous groups 
within the set of EU countries eligible to participate in European Monetary 
Union. From the viewpoint of the coherence and sustainability of EMU, the 
analysis provides assurance that there is a substantial core of economies that are 
similar by the criteria we have used. Moreover, a number of the countries whose 
economies are indicated not to belong to this core are, for the moment at least, 
outside the Euro-zone. If the criteria are useful diagnostics then perhaps the 
largest problems are indicated for those countries which seem furthest from the 
core: both OCA and Maastricht criteria indicate these to be Ireland and Finland. 
Of the two sets of criteria, it is the OCA criteria that indicate a real problem, 
related in particular to the asymmetry in business cycle experience enjoyed by 
these two countries. To overcome the disadvantages that this asymmetry brings, 
policy-makers in these countries may be called upon to exhibit ingenuity and 
flexibility in their command of policy instruments that remain under national 
control. The distinctive behaviour that sets Spain, Portugal and Italy aside is less 
related to asymmetric business cycle experience and has more to do with the 
lack of stability orientation exhibited by these countries in the past and to their 
labour market characteristics. The fact that these countries have taken the steps 
necessary to qualify may be a sign that the incentive effects built into the Treaty 
deadlines have worked to produce a sustainable change in stability orientation 
and in this case past behaviour is of little relevance to the future. It may be 
more generally true that past experience is little guide to the future: this is what 
the claim that the OCA criteria are endogenous would imply. If this view is 
correct, then initial asymmetry will produce transitory costs but not long-lasting 
strain. But whether this optimistic view is correct, remains to be seen. 
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Appendix A: Data 1 definitions and Source2 
Table A Data definitions and periods 
Country liP' Exchange rate4 Interest rate Period PPI/WPI' CPI' 
Germany 1979:4-95:10 79:4-95:9 Call money rate 79:4-95:8 WP1: 79:4-95:8 79:1-96:10 
France 1979:4-95:10 79:4-95:9 Call money rate 79:4-95:8 PPI: 80:1-95:8 79:1-96:10 
Italy 1979:4-95: I 0 79:4-95:9 Interbank deposit rate (3-montll) 79:4-95:8 PPI: 81:1-95:6 79:1-96:10 
Netherlands 1979:4-95:10 79:4-95:9 Call money rate 79:4-95:8 PPI: 79:4-95:7 79:1-96:10 
Belgium 1979:4-95:4 79:4-95:9 3-month treasury certificates 79:4-95:8 PP!: 80:1-95:7 79:1-96:10 
Denmark 1979:4-95:10 79:4-95:9 3-month interhank rate 79:4-95:8 PP!: 74:1-95:6 79:1-95:10 
Austria 1979:4-95:10 79:4-95:9 3-monlh VIBOR 79:4-95:8 WPI: 79:4-95:10 79:1-95:10 
Ireland 1979:4-95:9 79:4-95:9 Call money rate 79:4-95:8 WPI: 79:4-94:11 79:1-95:10 
Spain 1979:4-95:9 79:4-95:9 Call money rate 79:4-95:8 PPI: 79:4-95:6 79:1-95:10 
Portugal 1979:4-95:9 79:4-95:9 Treasury bill rate (91-day) 85:8-95:8 CPI: 79:4-95:8 79:1-95:10 
Switzerland 1979:4-95:10 79:4-95:9 3-month Euro-deposit 79:4-95:8 WPI: 79:4-95:8 79:1-95:10 
Sweden 1979:4-95:10 79:4-95:9 3-month treasury discount notes 79:4-95:8 PP!: 82:1-95:8 79:1-95:10 
Norway 1979:4-95:10 79:4-95:9 Call money rate 79:4-95:8 WPI: 79:4-95:8 79:1-95:10 
Finland 1979:4-95:10 79:4-95:9 Call money rate 79:4-95:8 PPI: 79:4-95:8 79:1-95:10 
Greece 1979:4-95:8 79:4-95:9 n.a.lo n.a. 10 CPI: 79:4-95:8 79:1-95:10 
UK 1979:4-95:10 79:4-95:9 Call money rate 79:4-95:8 PP!: 79:4-95:8 79:1-95:10 
us 1979:4-95:10 79:4-95:9 Federal fund rate 79:4-95:8 PPI: 79:4-95:8 79:1-96:10 
Canada 1979:4-95:10 79:4-95:9 90-day deposit receipts 79:4-95:8 PP!: 79:4-95:8 79:1-95:10 
Japan 1979:4-95:10 79:4-95:9 Certificates of deposit 79:5-95:8 WPI: 79:4-95:8 79:1-95:10 
Notes: 
1. All series are monthly except stated otherwise. 
2. All series are from the OECD database except for trade data which are abstracted from the IMF-DOTS database. 
3. liP for industrial production index. seasonally adjusted. 
4. Exchange rate series are rates against the US dollar, exchange rates against the deutschemark are derived assuming triangular arbitrage. 
5. PP! for producer prices index; WP! for wholesale prices index. 
6. CPI for consumer prices index. 7. Trade data are annual. 
8. The OECD standardized unemployment rate. 9. Quarterly data. 10. Adequate series are not available. 
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